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employment. In that case, Miss Harrison was a nurse being carried
in a motor vehicle driven by a servant of the defendant Krug, the
master of the plaintiff nurse. She was injured due to the negligence
of the driver while he was in the course of his employment. The
Harrison decision turned on the vicarious liability of the master for
the negligence of his servant, the driver. The court reasoned that
sec. 105 (2) was to be strictly construed and therefore did not abrogate
any existing common-law rights. The distinguishing facts in the
Harrison case, namely that the employer Krug was present in the
automobile and that Miss Harrison was in the course of her employment were held to be immaterial to the decision. It was decided
solely on the basis of vicarious liability, the existing common law
right held not to be abrogated by s. 105(2). These facts being immaterial, Mrs. Feldstein was therefore in the same position as Miss
Harrison. They both were passengers in a vehicle operated by a
driver, employed by the owner of the vehicle, and both were injured
by the negligence of the driver in the course of his employment. It
is submitted that there is no distinction between the two cases and
in fact none is made in the judgment. Mr. Justice Ferguson merely
mentioned the Harrison case, albeit with approval, and then set it
aside without further comment.
The doctrine of precedent and stare decisis is a fundamental
principle in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence. When faced with a prior
decision of his own appellate court on the same point of law, a trial
judge is obligated either to follow that decision or to make a careful
distinction in coming to a contrary result. As anomalous as the
Harrison decision might appear to be, that in itself is not sufficient
16
to justify a contrary decision.
C. R. BALL*

RUNNYmEDE IRON & STEEL VS. ROSSEN ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION
Co. LTD.-SALE OF GOODS-MIXED SHIPMENTS OF GOODS OF A DIFFERENT DESCRIPTION-SECTION 29(3) ONTARIO SALE OF GOODS ACT-

The purpose of this comment is to consider the effect of the recent

decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Runnymede Iron & Steel
Ltd. v. Rossen Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd.1 on the law in
relation to the sale of goods in Ontario. The facts were that Runnymede Iron made a contract with Rossen whereby the former was to
purchase all the "relaying rail" obtained from a salvage operation
being carried out by the latter at Hawk Lake. It is of some importance
that it was conceded that the contract was one for the sale of goods
by description and that the description was "relaying rails." After
16It is to be noted that no appeal was taken from this decision, as a
settlement was made out of court.
*Mr. Ball Is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 (1962), 30 D.L.R. (2d) 410 (S.C.C.), revg. [19542 O.R. 153 (Ont. CA.).
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a long delay Rossen shipped the goods by rail to Toronto where
Runnymede rejected them on the ground that the "rail shipped was
not of relaying grade." Runnymede then sued for the return of a
$6000 deposit it had made.
2
Schroeder, J., (the trial judge), as he then was, accepted the
evidence of one Merrilees, who purchased the rejected goods from
Rossen and held that 80% of the rails in the first car and 75% of
the rails in the remaining two cars could be classified as "siding
quality relaying rails." A fourth car was not in dispute. As for the
remaining rails in each car, he later remarked, they "could only
qualify as scrap material."
The learned trial judge also accepted the evidence of Merrilees
that "relaying rail" means any rail which can be relaid on any track.
The plaintiff argued that they were entitled to the return of
their deposit in that they had a right to reject the whole of the
goods by virute of sec. 29(3) of the Sale of Goods Act3 which reads:
Where the seller delivers to the buyer the goods he contracted to sell
mixed with goods of a different description not included in the contract,
the buyer may accept the goods which are in accordance with the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole.

The plaintiff's argument was that 20 to 25% of the goods
delivered were scrap and as such were "goods of a different description" within the meaning of sec. 29(3). Schroeder J. rejected this
contention and was unanimously affirmed by three members of the
Ontario Court of Appeal. 4 Gibson, J.A., delivering the judgment of
the Court of Appeal said:
Because some of the rails for one reason or another failed to come up
to standard required for relay rails and were therefore classified as
They are
scrap, they do not become "goods of a different description."
goods of the same description but inferior in quality.5

The principal case relied on by both the trial Judge and the
Court of Appeal was a decision of the Scottish Court of Session,
Aitken, Campbefl , o. v. Boullen & Gatenby.6 The contract there
was for the sale of "maroon twills" by sample. It was found that
64 of the 133 pieces delivered while answering the description "maroon twills" were of quality inferior to that of the sample, in that
they were too "tender", that is to say, they could only stand so
small a strain without breaking, as to be unmerchantable. The ratio
of the case was put by Lord Low in these words:
I am of opinion that this is not a case to which sec. 30(3) of the Sale of
Goods Act 1893 [the equivalent of the current Ontario sec. 29(3)] applies.
That enactment deals with the case of a seller delivering to a buyer
the goods he contracted to sell mixed with goods of a different descrip2 [19531 O.W.N. 772, affd. [19541 O.R. 153 (Ont. CA.).

3 R.S.O. 1960, c. 358.
4 Supra, footnote 2.
5 Ibid, (Ont. C.A.) at p. 164.
6 [1908] S.C. 490.
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tion not included in the contract. I think that the word "description"
is there plainly used to denote the kind of goods contracted for, and that
the right of partial rejection conferred upon the buyer applies only to
cases where goods of the kind contracted for, are mixed with goods of
a different kind, and not to cases where all the goods are of the kind
contracted for, but part of them is not of such good quality as the seller
was bound to supply.7
In the Supreme Court of Canada the decisions of Schroeder, J.,

and the Court of Appeal were reversed by a majority of three to two.
Kerwin, C.J.C.,

with whom Judson, J. concurred,

adopted, in

a

dissenting judgment, the views expressed by the lower courts and
held the above quotation from Lord Low's judgment in the Aitken
case "to be a correct statement applicable to the present case so far
as concerns the point to be determined." s
The judgment of the majority, consisting of Cartwright, Locke
and Ritchie, J.J., was delivered by Cartwright, J. who said:
The goods sold were described in the contract as "relaying rail" not as
used rail with a representation or warranty they would be of the quality
of "relaying rail" or of any particular quality. The appellant purchased
"relaying rail" he did not purchase potential relaying rail or scrap that
might be transformed into "relaying rail."
It appears to me to be a contradiction in terms to say that some of
the rails shipped failed to come up to the standard required for relaying
rails and were therefore classified as scrap and at the same time to
say that they do not thereby become goods of a different description.
This amounts to saying that the description "scrap" is the same as the
description "relaying rails".
In my opinion, the case falls within the terms of sec. 29(3) ...
The seller delivered to the buyer the "relaying rail" he contracted
9
to sell, mixed with goods of a different description (i.e. "scrap").
Cartwright, J. then goes on to state that the de minimis rule does

not apply and thus the plaintiff had the right to reject the goods
and could recover his deposit.
A close examination of the majority judgment reveals two possible views which can be taken. The first is the "broad" view that
for the purposes of sec. 29 (3) scrap materials are goods of a "different
description" than the object from which they were rendered scrap.
This would mean that whenever a shipment of goods under a contract

of description contains a substantial percentage of goods so inferior
in quality so as to be considered scrap, the buyer would be entitled
to reject the whole shipment. "Substantial" percentage here is used
to denote a percentage large enough so as to escape the operation of
the de minimis rule. This view is substantiated by the last para-

graph of the portion of the majority judgment quoted above.
However, the earlier portion of the passage seems to take a
"narrower" view of the scope of sec. 29 (3). At this point, Cartwright,
J. seems to be saying that we must examine the actual description
7 Ibid, at p. 494-5.
8Supra,footnote I at p. 414.
9 Ibid, at pp. 416-17.
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of the goods used in the contract. If the description imparts a
certain quality or standard then goods of the same generic description will not be "goods of the same description" within sec. 29(3)
unless they possess the stipulated quality or come up to the standard
described. In this case the description was "relaying rails." This was
found to mean rails that could be relaid on any track. The description then imparted the standard i.e. that the rails be suitable for
relaying on any track. In fact they were found to be not so suitable
and thus were not goods of the same description as the goods described in the contract.
A simple example will serve to illuminate the distinction between
the two views that have been indicated. Assume a contract for the
sale by description of two truckloads of used lumber which the
seller knows the buyer is going to use to build a garage. The lumber
is described in the contract as "boards 12 ft. to 16 ft. in length".
Upon delivery the buyer finds that about 20% of the boards are so
rotted and warped as to be completely unsuitable for building. Would
he be entitled to reject the whole two truckloads?
It is submitted that on the "broad" view extracted from the
Runnymede case the buyer could say "Twenty per cent of the lumber
is useless and therefore scrap. As such they are goods of a different
description and being mixed with goods of contract description, I am
entitled to reject the whole."
However on the second view the seller would argue "What you
contracted to buy were 'boards 12 ft. to 16 ft. in length' and every
board which you have received fits within that description. What
you call scrap are only boards within the description but of inferior
quality to what you expected to get." On the first view then the
buyer could reject the whole but on the second he could not, his only
remedy being in damages.' 0
There is of course great difficulty with the first view. In the
first place it becomes necessary to determine in each case when
inferior quality amounts to scrap. This would involve a difficult
process of drawing lines for the question is obviously one of degree.
The result would depend on which expert witness impressed the
trial judge the most. This is a violation of the basic principle that
in the realm of commercial law the law should be as definite as
possible so as to enable businessmen to make the quick decisions
they must. If this rule were adopted a buyer could never be very
certain as to whether he had the right to reject the whole of the
goods or not, for he could not be sure at what degree of inferior
quality the court would say that it was scrap and thus goods of a
different description.
10 Supra, footnote 3, s. 12. The possibility of the buyer fitting his case
within the implied condition of sec. 15, has not been considered.
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Another difficulty is that the word "scrap" as used in the
Runnymede case is a technical term to denote rails which are no
longer suitable for normal use. What about such things as rotten
apples or infected animals where the defect is such as to render them
unsuitable for normal use? The analogy appears to be a fair one, and
the extension of the rule to cover these cases would seem logical.
However, it would seem preposterous that a buyer of apples shipped
from British Columbia could reject the whole shipment on the ground
that 20% of the apples were rotten. It is clear also that the percentage need not be nearly as high as 20% for the only restriction
on the rule would seem to be de minimis non curat lex. For example,
Cartwvright J. quotes Jenkins, L.J. in Rapalli v. K. L. Take Ltd."
to the effect that:
... the purchaser is entitled to have delivered to him goods complying with
the contractual description and, failing that, he is entitled to reject unless
the rule de minimis in its strict sense applies. Clearly in my view
6%
to 7% is a proportion which cannot be disregarded as de minimis.12
It is submitted that the relatively "narrow" view expressed in the
majority judgment is the more commendable. The test there depends
on the words actually used in the description. If the description
specifies some standard or quality then the goods must come up to
that standard or possess that quality or they are goods of a different
description within sec. 29(3). Thus if a contract describes the goods
as "15 milking cows" and it turns out that on delivery three of them
have tuberculosis, the buyer's only remedy would be in damages.
However if the goods were described as "15 tuberculosis-free milking
cows" then the buyer could reject the whole 15 by virtue of sec. 29 (3)
on the ground that 20% of the goods were goods of a different
description.
The purpose of sec. 29(3) appears twofold. In the first place, it
respects the buyer's right to accept only the quantity ordered. If A
orders 100 articles but mixed with the order are 10 articles of a different description then A has only received 90 of the articles he contracted to buy. In the second place it respects the buyer's right to
reject that which he has not contracted to buy, the articles of a different description. It is submitted that the second, more restrictive view
of the case is more compatible with these purposes.
Another reason for preferring the "narrower" view is found in
the actual history of the case. The trial judge, three judges of the
Court of Appeal and two judges of the Supreme Court of Canada held
that mere inferior quality of goods does not render them "goods of a
different description" for the purposes of sec. 29(3) if they are of the
same "kind" as the goods described in the contract. Thus, if merely
counting noses is of any relevance the majority in the Supreme Court
of Canada was outvoted 6-3 on this issue during the course of the
litigation. In these circumstances, the case ought probably to be
11 [1958] 2 LI.L.R. 469.
12 Ibid, at p. 480.
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interpreted as narrowly as the explicit language and facts permit.
After all, the contract description in this case did in fact impose a
standard i.e. "relaying rails" and that standard was not complied with
by the seller. As Cartwright, J., says:
The goods sold were described in the contract as "relaying rail" not
as used rail with a representation or warranty that they would be of
the quality of "relaying rail" or of any particular quality. The appellant
purchased "relaying rail" he did not purchase "potential
relaying rail"
13
or scrap that might be transformed into "relaying rail."
Clearly had the description been "used rail" (as it in fact was in
the original negotiations until the buyer changed it)14 Cartwright, J.
would not have allowed recovery of the full deposit. If however the
"broad" view that "scrap rails" were goods of a different description
than "used rails" is what his Lordship meant, then clearly sec. 29 (3)
would apply. Language which would tend to support the general view
expressed can be found where Cartwright J. states,' 5 "The seller
delivered to the buyer the relaying rail he contracted to sell mixed
with goods of a different description (i.e. 'scrap')." However, it
should be noted here that his Lordship still retains the word "relaying." It is submitted that in view of his Lordship's whole judgment,
and the facts of the case, this statement cannot support the proposition
that the "scrap" state of an article is a thing of a "different description" than the article itself within the meaning of sec. 29 (3).
Cartwright, J. also based his judgment on Arcos Ltd. v. Ronaasen
6
& Son.1
In this case the House of Lords held a buyer entitled to reject
a shipment of '/2" barrel staves on the ground that 75.3% of the
staves were more than 1/2" but less than 9/16" thick, and 18.3% were
more than 9/16" but less than 5/8". Lord Atkin pointed out that
" inch does not mean about :/2 inch" and then went on to say, in a
passage quoted by Cartwright, J. that "no doubt there are microscopic deviations which business men and therefore lawyers will
ignore."
In adopting this case and in quoting Lord Atkin does Cartwright,
J. mean that the de minimis rule will only apply to save a contract
for sale of goods by description where the deviation from the contract
description is "microscopic"? The Arcos case involved a contract
where the description of the goods included dimensions. Surely the
same rigid test should not be used in relation to words of quality or
standard in a description of goods as might be properly applicable
where the description consists of dimensions.
Two further interesting points arise out of the judgments in the

Runnymede case. In his dissent, Kerwin, C.J.C. states that:
"It is apparent from the evidence that with a little cropping and drilling
at a very minor cost, the goods contained
in the cars In question could
all have been classified as relaying rails."17
13 Supra, footnote 1 at p. 416.
14 Supra, footnote 2, [19531 O.W.N. 772 at p. 772.
15 Supra,footnote I at p. 417.
16 [19331 A.C. 470, referred to supra,footnote 1 at p. 419.
17 Supra,footnote 1 at p. 413.
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Reading this along with the statement of Cartwright, J., that "the
appellant purchased relaying rail; he did not purchase 'potential relaying rail' or scrap that might be transformed into 'relaying rail'," can it
be inferred that a buyer need not do anything to bring the goods up
to contract standard, however trivial the work might be?
A final question that might be investigated in a more thorough
examination of the Runnymede case is whether or not words of
quality can ever be part of the description of goods in a contract for
the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act? This argument was presented
in the Court of Appeal but no mention was made of it in the judgments. Quality is a matter of degree. At some point a line must be
drawn between the goods on one side of contract quality and the
goods on the other side which are not. The location of this point may
be a very difficult question of fact. Perhaps it would be more conducive to modern business for the law to take no note of words of
quality in descriptions of goods in contracts where a right of rejection
of the goods is involved.
It would seem that the simplest view and the one with the most
certainty-so important an element in commercial law matters-is the
principle enunciated by Lord Low in the Aitken case, that is, that
goods of a "different description" in sec. 29(3) mean goods of a
different "kind". However, the highest court in the land has decided
to extend this principle. Exactly how much they have extended it
seems to be uncertain, but the case does seem to provide another
example of the view that doubt will be resolved in favour of the buyer.
PATRICK J. CULL*

THE SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS CASE-INTERNATIONAL LAW-UNITED NA-

TIONS CHARTER-ARTICLE 17-In July, 1962, the International Court
of Justice released an advisory opinion under the ambiguous heading
"Certain Expenses of the United Nations"l-an opinion, awaited with
great interest, in the case previously referred to as the SpeciaZ Assessments Case. In the result, the opinion represents the view of the court,
by a majority of 9 judges to 5, that the expenses incurred by the
various U.N. organs in pursuing the operations known as U.N.E.F.
and O.N.U.C. are "expenses of the Organization" within the meaning
of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter and are therefore proper
expenses to be dealt with by the General Assembly by way of assessment against the U.N. members.
*Mr.1 Cull is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School
Certain expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the
Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I.C.J. Reports 1962, p. 151.

